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We study a common value auction in which two bidders compete for an item the value of
which is a function of three independent characteristics. Each bidder observes one of these
characteristics, but one of them is “naive” in the sense that he does not realize the other bidder’s
signal contains useful information about the item’s value. Therefore, this bidder bids as if this
were an Independent Private Values auction. We show that the naive’s bidder payoff exceeds that
of his fully rational opponent for all symmetric unimodal signal distributions. We also show that
naive bidding is persistent in the evolutionary sense.
Keywords: Bounded Rationality, Evolutionary Stability, Bidding.
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1. INTRODUCTION.
In many common value auctions bidders competing for an item differ in the type of expertise
they have. Consider, for instance, two art dealers competing for a painting. Suppose that the
value of the painting in the retail market is a function of the artistic quality of the painting, the
quality of the material used to create the painting, and other factors, such as demand for paintings
of this type and the state of the economy. Suppose further that one of the two dealers is an expert
in judging the artistic quality of the painting while the other dealer is an expert in judging the
quality of the materials used for the painting.
We consider an ascending oral auction in which the first of these bidders is “naive” in the
sense that he does not infer any information about the value of the item from the bidding
behavior of his opponent. Naive bidding is not necessarily due to an inability to “do the math”
right. It could arise if the “naive” bidder erroneously believes that the other bidder is not an
expert in judging the quality of the painting. It could also arise if the “naive” bidder believes
(erroneously) that his competitor wants to purchase the item for private consumption on the basis
of some characteristic that is not valued by the market. Finally, it could also arise if the “naive”
bidder wants to purchase the painting for his own consumption on the basis of some
characteristic that is not observed by his competitor. In all of these possibilities, the bidding of
the other bidder is “noise” as far as the first bidder is concerned. In the last one of these
possibilities, the “naive” bidder is not naive at all, he simply has a different preference structure
than the other player: Even though he values the item on average as much as his competitor, his
valuation does not depend on any attributes that are observed by his competitor. The second
bidder is fully rational, i.e., he understands that he competes against a naive bidder and he
formulates his strategy optimally. Each of the two bidders observes a component of the value of
the item, which is referred to as that bidder’s signal. The actual value of the item equals the
product of the two signals and other unobserved factors. 
We show that, contrary to what is commonly believed, the payoff of the naive bidder
exceeds, in expected terms, the payoff of the rational bidder when the signal distribution is-2-
symmetric and unimodal. When the distribution of signals is not symmetric and unimodal the
rational bidder could, but is not guaranteed to, have higher expected payoff than the naive bidder.
Our findings have implications for the persistence of naive strategies in market environments.
A frequently used assertion used to support the use of the optimization hypothesis and agent
rationality in economic models is that suboptimal strategies and bounded rational agents will earn
lower payoffs, on average, than rational agents employing optimal strategies. If selection of the
strategies over time is a function of their relative profitability, then rational agents and optimal
strategies will eventually predominate. The results of this paper suggest that, in the environment
that we study, this is clearly not the case. Naive bidders can, and for symmetric unimodal
distributions of signals will, earn higher payoffs when matched against a fully rational bidder.
Therefore, naive bidding is likely to persist and, indeed, be more widespread than fully rational
bidding even if it were equally costly to acquire the ability to employ either strategy. We leave
the formal investigation of the distribution of bidder types in this bidding game for future work.   
2. MODEL.
2.1. Preliminaries.
Consider two bidders competing for an object. The value of the object is common to both
bidders and equals
V ’ " S1 S2 ,
where " is a constant,   is a signal of the value received by bidder 1,   is a signal of the value S1 S2
received by bidder 2, and , is a random variable. The expected value of two signals and of the
random variable , are normalized, without loss of generality, to 1. Further,  , and , are S1, S2
assumed to take non-negative values and be independent of each other. For notational simplicity,
we assume that the two signals are identically distributed with a non-degenerate density   and f(s)
associated continuous distribution function  . Finally, we assume that   is positive in the F(s) f(s)
interval  .  [Smin, Smax]   
1 More loosely, one could also think of the naive bidder as being a bidder who has not thought about the problem
and, therefore, has not formulated any beliefs.
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This framework captures a number of different bidding environments. One such environment
is the competition of two dealers for an item which they intend to resell. The signals of the
bidders represent different facets of the item. That is, each bidder is an expert in evaluating a
different determinant of the item’s value. In our model, these signals are assumed to be
independent of each other and identically distributed, i.e., the two characteristics that describe the
item are not correlated and of equal importance in determining the variability of the item’s value.
The actual value of the item to the winner also depends on factors that are not observable to
either of the two bidders, such as idiosyncratic consumer tastes for the item, economic conditions
at the time that the item is actually sold, and randomness in the realized price due to the thinness
in the market for this item. Another such environment is the competition between two firms for
oil leases. Both firms evaluate the oil bearing capacity of the track but drill in different places,
thus obtaining independent signals of the tracks value. The value will be super-additive in the
signals (as modeled here) if there are any returns to scale in extraction.
Bidder 1 is assumed to be “naive” in the sense that he does not infer any information about
the value of the item from the bidding behavior of his opponent. The naive bidder could be a
bidder who believes that the other bidder is not an expert in judging the quality of the item and
instead observes a signal that is pure noise. Alternatively, the naive bidder could be a bidder who
believes that his competitor wants to purchase the item on the basis of some characteristic that is
not valued by the market. Under both of these beliefs, the bidding behavior of the other bidder is
pure “noise.”
1 Therefore, the naive bidder does not condition his evaluation of the item’s worth
on the bidding behavior of his opponent. In effect, this bidder believes that the second facet of
the object’s value is not observed by anyone and that the value of the item to his competitor is a
random variable, V2, independent of S1, S2, and ,. Therefore, for bidder 1, the process that
describes the value of the item to himself can be described as 
V1 ’ " S1 0   
2 Notice that the above assumptions imply that bidder 1 believes that he is competing in a privately known values
auction.
   
3 We note, parenthetically, that this model could also arise if both bidders are rational but have the following
asymmetric preference structures. Both bidders have the same average value for the item. However, bidder 1 does
not care about the facet of the object that is observed by Bidder 2 and wants to purchase the item for his own
consumption.  The preferences of bidder 2 are as described in the text. 
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where 0 is a random variable with mean equal to 1 and no correlation with V2.
2  
The second bidder is fully rational, i.e., he understands that he competes against a naive
bidder and he formulates his strategy optimally.
3
Both bidders are risk neutral and compete in an oral ascending auction with no reserve. We
model the bidding process by a “thermometer” auction. Alternatively, one could model the
bidding as a 2
nd price sealed-bid auction, as the two formats are equivalent in this particular
setting. 
2.2. Bidder Strategies.
Based on his beliefs, the naive bidder has a dominant strategy to stay in the auction until the
price reaches his reservation value. Since he is risk neutral, his reservation value,  , equals the R1
expected value of the object conditional on his signal, that is, 
R1 ’ " S1
The rational bidder will stay in the auction as long as the price is such that, if he were to win
at that price, he would reap positive expected surplus. Given the naive bidder’s strategy, winning
the object at a price P implies that the signal of bidder 1 was
.  S1 ’ P
"
Therefore, immediately upon winning the item at a price equal to P the rational bidder would
calculate its expected value to equal: -5-




Notice that when the signal of bidder 2 is less than 1, he would regret winning the item
regardless of the realized price. On the contrary, when his signal is greater than 1 the expected
value of the item, upon winning it, exceeds its price regardless of the price that he wins it at.
Hence, an optimal strategy of the rational bidder is to immediately quit the auction if he observes
a below average signal and stay in the auction until he wins if he observes an above average
signal.
The intuition for this is as follows: the naive bidder computes the expected value of the item
“as if” the signal of other bidder is equal to its mean, i.e., equals 1. When the signal of bidder 2 is
less than one, the naive bidder overestimates the value of the item and therefore would be willing
to push its price above its expected value. Realizing this, the rational bidder will have no reason
to enter the bidding. When bidder 2 gets an above average signal, i.e.,  , the naive bidder S2 > 1
will underestimate the value of the item and therefore would drop out before its price reaches its
expected value. Realizing this, the rational bidder will stay in the auction until he wins the item.
Of course, this is not, in general, the only optimal strategy of bidder 2.  Observe that the
lowest possible price at which the naive bidder will drop out is  . This is a positive Pmin ’ " Smin
number unless  . Therefore, bidder 1 can bid the price up to  with impunity: He is at Smin ’ 0 Pmin
no risk of winning.  Doing so will result in no benefit to him compared to the strategy of
dropping out at the start of the auction. In fact, if he incurs even infinitesimal costs from bidding
he will strictly prefer to drop out at the very start. On the other hand, if he is aggressive, in the
sense that he attaches a tiny value to making his opponent pay a higher price, he will stay in the
auction until the price reaches   (and will drop out at that point). In the main body of the Pmin
paper we consider the equilibrium in which he the rational bidder drops out at a price equal to
zero when he gets a below average signal. In the Appendix we consider the other extreme at
which the rational bidder drops out at a price equal to  . Similar results are Pmin ’ " Smin $ 0
obtained in either case.-6-
3. RESULTS.
3.1. Payoff of the Naive Bidder.
Notice that if the rational bidder’s signal is less than 1 and the naive bidder’s signal is equal
to  , the payoff of the rational bidder,  , is zero, since he will drop out of the auction, S1 A
cc
2 (S1, S2)





1 (S1, S2) ’ " S1 S2
This follows from the fact that, in the absence of a reserve, the naive bidder will win the item
at a price equal to zero. The naive bidder wins the item when its value is lower than average but










f(S2) " S1 S2 dS2
Integrating over the distribution of bidder 1's signals yields the ex ante payoff of the naive












Pr[S2<1] E[S2 | S2<1] " f(S1) S1 dS1





Given that the expected value of a bidder’s signal equals 1, the ex ante payoff of the naive
bidder can be written as
. A1 ’ " Pr[S2<1] E[S2 | S2<1]
Note that this payoff is positive since every term is positive and less than the expected value
of the item, ", since the last two terms are both less than 1. -7-
3.2. Payoff of the Rational Bidder.
Notice that if the rational bidder’s signal is   and the naive bidder’s signal is  , the S2 > 1 S1
payoff of the naive bidder is zero, since he fails to win the auction, while the payoff of the
rational bidder, conditional on   and   equals S1 S2
A
cc
2 (S1, S2) ’ " S1 S2 & P
’ " S1 S2 & " S1
’ " S1 (S2 & 1)
Notice that the higher the signal of the naive bidder, the higher the conditional payoff of the
rational bidder. This is because the price raises slower than the value of the object when  , as S2>2
the naive bidder implicitly sets   when computing the value of the object. Also notice that S2’1
the rational bidder wins the item when it is relatively valuable.













2(S2) ’ " (S2 & 1)
since the expected value of  is equal to 1. The ex ante payoff of the rational bidder,  , i.e., his S1 A2
payoff before he obtains any information on the item, is obtained by integrating his conditional





f(S2) " (S2 & 1) dS2
’ " Pr[S2>1] E[S2&1 | S2>1]
Notice that   since every term in the expression above is positive. A2>0-8-
3.3. Comparison of Payoffs.
Which type of bidder has higher ex ante profits? It turns out, as we show below, that the
payoffs of the two bidders can not be unambiguously ranked: under some parametrizations the
naive bidder earns a higher payoff than the rational bidder, for other parametrizations the reverse
is true. However, much insight (and some interesting results) can be obtained by considering the
signal distributions that are symmetric with respect to their mean. 
In particular, when the signal distributions are symmetric, the expected payoffs of either
bidder can be written as a function of a single conditional expectation of the signals. This
conditional expectation is a measure of signal dispersion. As Proposition 1 shows below, the
profits of each bidder are monotonic in this expectation: the rational bidder’s payoff increases
with signal dispersion whereas the naive bidder’s payoff decreases with signal dispersion. 
PROPOSITION 1. Consider signal distributions that are symmetric. Then, a sufficient
information for the expected payoff of either bidder is the signal dispersion as measured
by  , i.e., the difference between the mean and the expected value of z / 1 & E[S | S<1]
the signal conditional on it being lower than the mean. The  rational bidder’s payoff
increases with the dispersion of the signal while the naive bidder’s payoff decreases with
the dispersion of the signal. 
Proof.  When the signal distribution is symmetric the probability that the rational bidder’s
signal will exceed the mean equals the probability that it will be lower than the mean, i.e.,
.  Pr[S2>1] ’ Pr[S2<1] ’ 1
2
Let 
E[S2 | S2<1] ’ 1 & z
where   is a measure of the dispersion of the signal distribution. Then,  z0[0,1]-9-
. E[S2 | S2] ’ 1 % z











Note that the rational bidder’s payoff increases with the dispersion of the signal while the
naive bidder’s payoff decreases with the dispersion of the signal. # 
The naive bidder’s payoff decreases with the dispersion of the signal because (i) in the event
that he wins, he pays of price of zero, and (ii) he wins when the signal of his opponent, i.e., one
of the components of the item’s value, is below average.  Therefore, an increase in the signal
dispersion reduces the expected value of the item in the events that he wins without reducing the
price that he pays for it. Conversely, an increase in the signal dispersion increases the payoff of
the rational bidder because (i) the expected price that he pays equals   and is independent of his "
signal but (ii) he wins when his signal is above average. Therefore, signal dispersion does not
increase his expected payment but increases the expected value of the item in the events that he
wins. 
Since for symmetric signal distributions the profit response of the two bidders is monotonic
to signal dispersion but exhibits the opposite response, there may exist some critical level of
signal dispersion such that for lower levels of dispersion the naive bidder’s payoff exceeds that of
the fully rational bidder while for higher levels of dispersion the converse is true. In principle,
this critical dispersion level could be zero which would imply that the fully rational bidder has-10-
higher expected profits for all symmetric signal distributions. However, Corollary 1 below shows
that this critical dispersion level is bounded away from zero.
COROLLARY 1. When the signal distribution is symmetric the expected payoff of the naive
bidder exceeds that of the rational bidder if  , i.e. if the expected value E[S] < 2 E[S | S<1]
of the signal is less than two times the expected value of signal conditional on it being
lower than the mean.
Proof.  Using the expressions for bidder payoffs obtained in the Proof of Proposition 1 above,
we can see that the naive bidder has a higher payoff than the rational bidder when 
"
2
(1 & z) > "
2
z Y
1 & z > z Y
. z < 1
2
Since   the above implies z / 1 & E[S | S<1]
1 & E[S | S<1] < 1
2
Y
E[S | S<1] > 1
2
Y
2 E[S | S<1] > E[S]
where the last step follows from the fact that  .  #  E[S] ’ 1-11-
Notice that expected value of the item is equal to   regardless of signal dispersion. Corollary "
2 below states that a change in signal dispersion does not affect the distribution of the surplus
between the seller and the two bidders. Therefore, a change in dispersion does not affect the size
of the “pie” the two bidders split between them, but only their shares of that pie.
COROLLARY 2. When the signal distribution is symmetric the seller’s expected  revenue is
independent of signal dispersion and equals half the expected value of the item. 
Proof.  Using the profits of the two bidders, as derived in the Proof of Proposition 1 above,
we can show that the sum of the bidders’ profits, A, is independent of the distribution and equals
A ’ "
2
(1 & z % z)
’ "
2
In expected terms, the two bidders split with the seller the surplus of the auction regardless of
the distribution of the signals. Since seller revenue and buyer surplus add up to the value of the
item, the expected revenue of the seller equals "/2. Therefore, a change in the signal dispersion
changes the division of the surplus between the two bidders with affecting seller revenue.  # 
A much stronger result with regards to relative bidder profits can be obtained if we further
reduce the distribution of signals to be unimodal. As Corollary 3 states below, for this important
class of signal distributions the expected payoff of the naive bidder will exceed that of the
rational bidder.
COROLLARY 3. When the signal distribution is symmetric unimodal the expected payoff
of the naive bidder is higher than that of the rational bidder. -12-
Proof. Consider a symmetric unimodal signal distribution, f(s), and denote the expectation of
S conditional on it being lower than the mean by  . Note that the probability mass of Ef[S | S < 1]
f(s) can be spread evenly over its support to yield a uniform distribution with the same support.
For this, corresponding, uniform distribution, denote the expectation of S, conditional on it being
lower than the mean, by  .  E
f
u[S | S < 1]
It is clear that
E
f
u[ S | S < 1] < Ef[ S | S < 1] Y
. 1 & E
f
u[ S | S < 1] > 1 & Ef[ S | S < 1]
Observe that for all uniform distributions with mean equal to 1 and support exclusively on
the non-negative numbers
. E[ S | S < 1] $ 1
2
Then, from Corollary 1 and the inequality above, it follows that when the signal distribution
is symmetric unimodal the expected payoff of the naive bidder is higher than that of the rational
bidder. # 
3.4. Example With Non-Symmetric Signal Distributions. 
The results of the previous section were all derived under the assumption that the signal
distribution is symmetric. However, it is easy to see that the profits of the “naive” bidder will
exceed, in expected terms, those of the fully rational bidder for all distributions with sufficiently
low dispersion. -13-
4. THE EVOLUTIONARY STABILITY OF “NAIVE” BIDDING.
The fact that a naive bidder obtains higher payoff than a fully rational competitor when the
distribution of signals is symmetric and unimodal suggests that naive bidding may persist even in
the long run. Indeed, this turns out to be the case, when persistence is defined as a non-zero
proportion of types in an evolutionary equilibrium. In particular, one can show that when (i) the
distribution belongs to a number of different sub-classes of symmetric unimodal distributions,
(ii) pairs of bidders are matched randomly from a population of bidder types which includes a
proportion q of naive bidders, and (iii) the proportion of the bidder type that has higher expected
profits increases. Then there is a unique proportion   of naive bidders such that the qeq 0 (0, 1)
expected profits of a naive bidder equal the expected profits of a rational bidder, that is, there is a
unique interior proportion of naive types that constitutes an evolutionary equilibrium.
Furthermore, populations that consist of one type only (i.e, either of all rational or of all naive
bidders) are not stable, i.e,  they are not robust to mutations. Further, we believe that this result
holds more generally for all symmetric unimodal distributions (and not only for the sub-classes
for which it has been demonstrated) and we believe are near a general proof.
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS.
It is generally thought that non-sophisticated bidding in common value auctions will result in
lower profits. Bidders that are not properly taking into consideration the fact that other bidders
behavior is informative about the value of an item to themselves and who are ignoring any
possible asymmetries in the quality of information will endo up overpaying and winning items of
lower quality. In the simple model considered in this paper we show that a mildly naive bidder
will indeed win items of lower quality than his fully rational competitor. However, he ends up
getting them at bargain prices, while his fully rational opponent pays much higher prices for the
items he wins. As a result, the expected profits of the naive bidder exceed the expected profits of
the fully rational bidder for a wide class of signal distributions. -14-
The intuition for these results can be summarized as follows: When the rational bidder
observes a low signal of the item’s value he realizes that the naive bidder will overestimate the
value of the item regardless of his signal. The overestimate arises because the naive bidder
estimates the value of the item using the expected value of his competitor’s signal. Therefore, the
rational bidder can only win the item by overpaying for it and he optimally chooses not to
compete. As a consequence, the naive bidder wins the item at the lowest possible price. In
contrast, when the rational bidder observes a high signal he realizes that the naive bidder will
underestimate the value of the item regardless of his signal. Therefore, the naive bidder will drop
out at a price that is lower than the item’s value and, as a result, the rational bidder optimally
chooses to stay in the auction until he wins. However, in competing for the item, the naive bidder
raises the price the rational bidder has to pay. 
The results of this paper may appear, at first sight,  paradoxical. How can a “boundedly
rational bidder earn a higher payoff when competing with a bidder with a fully rational bidder?
After all, the fully rational bidder can always imitate a boundedly rational one. The key insight is
that the naive bidder enjoys an advantage in terms of commitment: nature has picked his type to
be naive. Given that the rational bidder is faced with a naive opponent he does better by bidding
rationally rather than naively. Were a rational bidder to face another rational bidder, he would
have preferred to have been naive. Unfortunately (for the rational bidder) nature gives the naive
bidder a first mover advantage.